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It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the unconscionability 
doctrine to federal arbitration law.  In the last three decades, as the Supreme 
Court has expanded the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1 arbi-
tration clauses have become a routine part of consumer, franchise, and em-
ployment contracts.  Some companies have sought not just to funnel cases 
away from courts, but to tilt the scales of justice in their favor: stripping 
remedies, slashing discovery, selecting biased arbitrators, eliminating the 
right to bring a class action, and saddling adherents with prohibitive costs 
and fees.2  The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as the primary 
check on drafter overreaching.  The Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
that lower courts can invoke unconscionability to invalidate one-sided arbi-
tration provisions,3 and dozens (perhaps hundreds) of judges have done ex-
actly that.4 
Recently, however, a rising chorus of voices argues that the FAA al-
lows arbitrators, but not judges, to strike down arbitration clauses as un-
conscionable.5  These critics make three main points.  First, they argue that 
the FAA, which limits judicial discretion, is incompatible with unconscio-
nability, which is one of the most subjective and amorphous rules in all of 
law.6  Second, they assert that Congress recognized that the statute might al-
low powerful drafters to exploit weaker parties, but nevertheless concluded 
that its benefits outweighed these risks.7  Third, they seize upon a seeming 
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courts to invalidate arbitration clauses under ―such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract‖8—a phrase that arguably en-
compasses all contract defenses, including unconscionability.  Yet § 4 only 
allows judges to hear challenges to the ―making of the agreement for arbi-
tration.‖9  Unconscionability revolves, in part, around substantive fairness, 
not the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause.  Thus, the claim proceeds, be-
cause unconscionability does not fall within § 4, judges cannot employ the 
rule.10  I will call this group of arguments the ―anti-court‖ theory. 
The anti-court theory took on a new dimension in April 2011, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the 
FAA preempts a California Supreme Court rule that had rendered most 
class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable.11  The logic 
in Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion—that the California law is inconsistent 
with the ―purposes and objectives‖ of the FAA—earned the support of only 
three other Justices.  Although Justice Thomas ―reluctantly‖ joined the ma-
jority opinion, he wrote separately to explain that he believes § 4 restricts 
§ 2‘s ―savings clause‖ to defenses that relate to the ―making‖ of the arbitra-
tion provision.12  In other words, Justice Thomas adopts one of the anti-
court theory‘s premises, but arrives at a different, more drastic conclusion: 
whereas the anti-court theory posits that judges cannot apply unconsciona-
bility to arbitration clauses, Justice Thomas implies that nobody can apply 
unconscionability to arbitration clauses.13  I will call this the ―anti-
unconscionability‖ theory.  Because Justice Thomas provided the swing 
vote in Concepcion, and invited parties to address the link between §§ 2 and 
4 in the future,14 he ensured that unconscionability‘s viability will become a 
flashpoint in the arbitration wars. 
This Essay challenges the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theo-
ries.  First, it argues that the anti-court theory is impossible to square with 
the FAA.  The statute‘s core provision, § 2, only validates arbitration claus-
es if they do not violate ―grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.‖15  
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Section 2 thus predicates arbitration on the existence of an arbitration clause 
that is not unconscionable.  The anti-court theory does not comply with this 
sensible mandate because it requires judges to compel arbitration even 
when faced with a flagrantly unconscionable (and thus unenforceable) arbi-
tration clause. 
Second, this Essay debunks the idea, common to both the anti-court 
and anti-unconscionability theories, that § 4 restricts § 2‘s defenses to those 
that relate to the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause.  Focusing exclusively 
on the statute‘s text, as Justice Thomas purports to do, actually demon-
strates that § 2 preserves all contract doctrines that can be grounds for the 
rescission of an agreement.  Although § 2 excludes one variation of uncons-
cionability, a rule I call ―equitable‖ unconscionability, it embraces the mod-
ern unconscionability doctrine that courts actually apply to arbitration 
clauses.  Thus, the statute neither strips judges of the power to apply un-
conscionability nor excludes unconscionability completely. 
I. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Today, most courts and scholars think of unconscionability as a single, 
monolithic doctrine.  In this Part, I show that in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, unconscionability actually consisted of several discrete 
principles.  Then, I describe how the passage of the FAA made the precise 
contours of unconscionability one of the most important and contentious is-
sues in federal arbitration law. 
A. Pre-FAA Unconscionability 
Before the twentieth century, most judges described contracts as ―un-
conscionable‖ if they were too one-sided to specifically enforce.  As the 
Michigan Supreme Court succinctly put it: ―Specific performance is a re-
medy of grace, rather than right, and will be refused where it is inequitable 
to grant it.‖17  Even a modest degree of unfairness could trigger this manife-
station of the rule.  For example, one court denied specific performance of a 
deal to sell a tract of land for $14,000 because its fair market value was 
$15,000.18  I will call this ―equitable‖ unconscionability. 
Judges also used another variation of unconscionability to limit the 
damages available in an action at law.  This version of the rule required a 
stronger showing of injustice than equitable unconscionability.  For exam-
ple, in Hume v. United States, the federal government argued that a contract 
calling for it to purchase shucks for thirty-five times their market price was 
unconscionable.19  The Supreme Court agreed, and awarded the seller noth-
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the agreement was ―fraudulent‖ because it was ―such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no hon-
est and fair man would accept on the other.‖21  Because judges in these cas-
es held that the consideration was so imbalanced that fraud was ―intrinsic‖ 
to the exchange, I will refer to it as the ―intrinsic fraud‖ rule. 
Finally, courts employed a third version of unconscionability to nullify 
entire contracts.  These cases featured two elements.  First, because of a 
flaw in the contracting process—―imbecility,‖ intoxication, old age, or a 
language barrier—one party could not fully understand the bargain.22  This 
component distinguished the rule from intrinsic fraud, which was available 
even to sophisticated parties with bargaining power.23  Second, this manife-
station of unconscionability required the terms of the agreement to be harsh 
or ―improvident.‖24  Although the opinions are inconsistent, the degree of 
unfairness sufficient to rescind a contract generally exceeded that required 
for equitable unconscionability, but was less than that necessary for intrin-
sic fraud.25  As with intrinsic fraud, though, the basis of the rule was that 
one party had not given her authentic, autonomous assent to the transac-
tion.26  I will describe this doctrine as ―rescission‖ unconscionability. 
Before the twentieth century, courts did not apply the unconscionabili-
ty doctrine in any of its incarnations to arbitration clauses.  But as I describe 
next, two major developments—the enactment of the FAA and the rise of 
standard form contracts—would pit arbitration and unconscionability 
against each other. 
B. The FAA 
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA.27  The statute sought to override 
the deep-seated suspicion of arbitration that American courts had inherited 
along with the common law.28  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
English courts had invented unique rules to prevent litigants from settling 
disputes outside of the judicial system.  Under the ouster doctrine, they in-
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tion.29  And under the rule of revocability, courts allowed parties to retract 
their consent to arbitrate until the very moment that the arbitrator rendered 
an award.30  The FAA abolished these anti-arbitration measures.  Section 2, 
the statute‘s ―centerpiece,‖31 instructs courts that they can only use tradi-
tional contract principles—not the ouster or revocability doctrines—to nul-
lify a contract to arbitrate: 
 
A written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitra-
tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.32 
 
Yet the FAA did not cut judges out of the loop completely.  If a dispute 
arises about the ―making of the agreement for arbitration,‖ § 4 tasks courts 
(or juries) with resolving it.33  For reasons that will become apparent, I will 
quote § 4 in detail later. 
C. Modern Unconscionability 
Decades after the FAA‘s enactment, courts and scholars struggled to 
assimilate the standard form (or ―adhesion contract‖) into contract law.  
These non-negotiated, unilaterally-drafted documents reduced transaction 
costs.34  At the same time, though, they threatened to undermine the very 
definition of a ―contract.‖  Although binding agreements supposedly arose 
from words or conduct that each party could reasonably construe as assent 
to the exchange, drafters knew that few (if any) adherents would read the 
boilerplate.  As a result, standard forms—particularly self-serving provi-
sions in standard forms—did not seem to meet the minimum standards for 
contract formation.35 
Courts and policymakers responded, in part, by revamping the uncons-
cionability doctrine.  In the mid-1960s, building on the foundation laid by 
―rescission‖ unconscionability, they created an unconscionability rule tai-
lored to standard forms.  This doctrine, which I will call ―modern‖ uncons-
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jurisdictions today.36  Procedural unconscionability hinges on the circums-
tances surrounding contract formation, such as whether a provision was of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or buried in fine print.37  Substantive 
unconscionability arises when a term is ―overly-harsh‖ or ―one-sided.‖38  By 
allowing courts to invalidate terms that suffer from these defects, modern 
unconscionability penalizes drafters for overreaching and maintains judicial 
integrity.39  But more importantly, it isolates terms to which adherents do 
not assent in any meaningful way.  As the D.C. Circuit explained in the wa-
tershed case of Williams v. Walker–Thomas Furniture Co.: ―[W]hen a party 
of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially 
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly 
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, 
was ever given to all the terms.‖40  Indeed, modern unconscionability em-
powers courts to strike down provisions that ―fall outside the ‗circle of as-
sent‘ which constitutes the actual agreement.‖41 
When the Court expanded the scope of the FAA in the mid-1980s, it 
transformed modern unconscionability into the most important—and con-
troversial—doctrine in federal arbitration law.  Responding to the Court‘s 
pro-arbitration jurisprudence, companies of all sizes placed arbitration 
clauses in their standard form contracts.42  Often these provisions not only 
required the parties to bypass the judicial system, but also created an alter-
native procedural regime that favored the drafter.43  Courts annulled so 
many of these clauses that modern unconscionability became defined large-
ly by its role in the arbitration context.44  In turn, this entanglement with ar-
bitration created a new problem.  On the one hand, the overwhelming 
consensus among judges and commentators—reinforced by dicta in several 
Court opinions—was that unconscionability was a ―‗ground[] . . . for the 
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tion clause under § 2.45  On the other hand, unconscionability was so tied to 
arbitration that it seemed less like a traditional contract defense and more 
like a specialized anti-arbitration measure.  Scholars began to protest that 
courts were manifesting a ―new judicial hostility to arbitration‖ by applying 
a stricter version of unconscionability to arbitration clauses.46  In fact, Con-
cepcion was the culmination of a long struggle by corporate defendants to 
get the Court to review a lower court‘s unconscionability ruling that alle-
gedly discriminated against arbitration.47 
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are the latest embo-
diment of this pushback.  I critique both in the next two Parts. 
II. THE ANTI-COURT THEORY: ARBITRATION WITHOUT A VALID 
ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
Under the anti-court theory, arbitrators can apply unconscionability, 
but judges cannot.  Before I address this thesis on its own terms, I will high-
light a reason why it cannot be correct: it would force courts to compel arbi-
tration before determining that a valid arbitration clause exists. 
The Court often declares that arbitration is ―a matter of contract.‖48  
Section 2 enshrines this principle by making a binding arbitration clause—
one that is not susceptible to ―grounds . . . for the revocation of any con-
tract‖49—the price of admission to arbitration.  However, the anti-court 
theory would send disputes to arbitration without insisting that the drafter 
lay this foundation.  For instance, Stephen Friedman, who endorses the anti-
court theory in a brilliant article, argues that even judges faced with a fla-
grantly unconscionable arbitration clause ―must grit their teeth‖50 and com-
pel arbitration.  But that would allow arbitration to conjure itself out of thin 
air.  If an arbitration clause is blatantly unconscionable, it is unenforceable 
under § 2, and there is no basis for arbitration. 
There are two seeming exceptions to this principle, but neither go as 
far as the anti-court theory.  First, the FAA requires courts to honor 
―invalid‖ arbitration clauses because it preempts traditional contract law.  
For instance, the Court has interpreted the statute to eradicate certain 
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As a result, a court cannot strike down an arbitration clause just because a 
state has a strong interest in guaranteeing a judicial forum for certain 
claims.  This may or may not be normatively desirable, but it flows natural-
ly from the fact that the FAA preempts any state law that obstructs its goals.  
Critically, however, neither judges nor arbitrators can apply the public poli-
cy defense in this manner.  It is not a viable defense to an arbitration clause.  
Conversely, the anti-court theory candidly acknowledges that unconsciona-
bility is a permissible defense to an arbitration clause.  Indeed, even under 
the anti-court theory, unconscionability is a non-preempted 
―ground[] . . . for the revocation of any contract‖ under § 2.  Thus, when a 
court enforces an unconscionable arbitration clause, it does not merely 
uphold a term that would be invalid under quotidian contract law—it 
upholds a term that is invalid under the FAA itself.  The anti-court theory 
cannot be squared with the statute it seeks to interpret. 
Second, although the FAA allows arbitrators to decide gateway issues 
about the arbitration itself, it does not permit a judge to enforce an arbitra-
tion clause that triggers a non-preempted ―ground[] . . . for revocation of 
any contract.‖  For instance, arbitrators can determine whether a particular 
dispute falls within the scope of the clause.  However, that is not the same 
as whether the arbitration clause is valid under § 2.  Similarly, under the se-
parability doctrine, courts must treat any contract that contains an arbitra-
tion clause as two contracts: (1) the overarching agreement that includes the 
arbitration clause (the ―container contract‖) and (2) the contract to arbi-
trate.52  The separability doctrine permits arbitrators to resolve allegations 
that the container contract is unenforceable.53  But when a party specifically 
challenges the arbitration clause, a court decides the issue.54  Thus, even 
under the separability doctrine, arbitration cannot proceed unless a judge 
has determined that the arbitration clause satisfies § 2. 
Likewise, the Court‘s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson55 conditions arbitration on the existence of an arbitration clause that 
a judge has vetted for the full range of non-preempted ―grounds . . . for re-
vocation of any contract.‖  In Rent-A-Center, the Court extended the sepa-
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rability rule to so-called ―delegation clauses,‖ which expressly authorize the 
arbitrator to decide the very issue of whether the arbitration clause is enfor-
ceable.56  The Court held that if a contract contains a delegation clause, 
judges cannot decide whether the arbitration clause is valid unless a party 
first overturns the delegation clause.57  But the Court reached this conclu-
sion by conceptualizing delegation clauses as stand-alone, mini-arbitration 
clauses within arbitration clauses within container contracts: ―an agreement 
to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.‖58  In oth-
er words, even if a contract contains a delegation clause, a case does not 
proceed directly to arbitration.  Rather, a court must decide whether the del-
egation clause is valid under § 2.59  Again, under no circumstances can draf-
ters do what the anti-court theory would permit them to do: completely end-
run the judiciary by creating self-enforcing agreements to arbitrate. 
Finally, the anti-court theory would have perverse results.  It would 
give arbitrators the exclusive right to decide whether an arbitration clause is 
unconscionable even when the unfair features of the clause make it harder 
to prove that the arbitration clause is unconscionable.  Suppose the drafter 
reserves the right to select the arbitrator.  As the Fourth Circuit declared, 
such an arrangement ―ensure[s] a biased decisionmaker.‖60  However, with-
out a prophylactic layer of court involvement, the biased decisionmaker 
would preside over the claim in which she is biased.  Of course, the law to-
lerates self-interested adjudication when a judge must decide whether to re-
cuse herself, but judges are never unilaterally appointed by one party.  And 
unlike arbitrators, their rulings (both on recusal motions and the merits) are 
subject to the full panoply of appellate review.  Thus, by allowing arbitra-
tors complete dominion over their own neutrality, the anti-court theory en-
courages abuse.  Similarly, if drafters impose exorbitant arbitral costs or 
choose an inconvenient forum, the only way for consumers, franchisees, or 
employees to obtain a ruling that these provisions are unconscionable 
would be to endure the exact injustices—paying excessive fees or travelling 
far away—that made the provisions unconscionable. 
For these reasons, Congress did not exempt arbitration clauses from 
unconscionability challenges in court.  In the next Part, I examine the anti-
court and anti-unconscionability theories in greater detail. 
III. THE FLAWED FOUNDATION OF THE ANTI-COURT AND ANTI-
UNCONSCIONABILITY THEORIES 
As I mentioned at the outset of this Essay, anti-court proponents make 





  Id. at 2777. 
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  Id. at 2780–81. 
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  Id. at 2777. 
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  See id. at 2777–78. 
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  Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (link). 
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bility to arbitration clauses because (1) unconscionability gives judges too 
much discretion, (2) Congress passed the FAA even though it recognized 
that stronger parties might foist arbitration on others, and (3) unconsciona-
bility does not relate to the ―making of the agreement to arbitrate‖ under 
§ 4. 
Although the anti-unconscionability theory is less developed, it maps 
onto these assertions perfectly.  Each argument drives a wedge between the 
FAA and unconscionability, suggesting that unconscionability cannot be a 
defense to an arbitration clause.  Moreover, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence 
in Concepcion holds that certain strands of unconscionability do not relate 
to the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause. 
A. Judicial Discretion 
According to the anti-court camp, there is tension between the FAA, 
which eliminates judicial discretion in several areas, and unconscionability, 
which gives judges wide leeway to do what they wish.  Indeed, the FAA 
severely limits the grounds on which courts can vacate, modify, or overrule 
an arbitrator‘s award.61  It also requires courts to stay litigation and compel 
arbitration ―in accordance with the terms of the agreement‖ if a dispute falls 
within the scope of a valid arbitration clause.62  Unconscionability, on the 
other hand, revolves around ―fairness‖—an utterly subjective norm—and 
allows courts to annul some aspects of the arbitration clause while uphold-
ing others.  Moreover, the theory continues, Congress passed the FAA to 
abolish the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration.63  Thus, it could not have 
wanted courts to apply a doctrine that could easily camouflage the same an-
tagonism toward extrajudicial dispute resolution. 
Yet this argument sweeps too broadly.  Unconscionability is not the 
only fact-sensitive, pliable rule that courts use to strike down arbitration 
clauses (or portions of arbitration clauses).  Consider the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.  Judges have relied on the implied covenant 
to nullify one-sided arbitral procedures64 and drafters‘ attempts to unilateral-
ly add arbitration clauses to existing contracts.65  However, good faith—a 
―chameleon‖ which lacks ―a settled meaning‖—is just as nebulous as un-
conscionability,66 and no court, scholar, or litigant of whom I am aware has 
argued that it is off limits to judges in the arbitration arena.  Similarly, 
courts routinely decide that a party has waived its right to arbitrate, even 





  9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006) (link). 
62
  Id. at §§ 3, 4 (link). 
63
  See Friedman, supra note 5, at 2051. 
64
  See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940. 
65
  See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Ct. App. 1998) (link). 
66
  Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988) (link). 
67
  See, e.g., Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., No. 4851, 2011 WL 2792385, at *8 (S.C. Ct. App. Ju-
ly 13, 2011) (―There is no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate; the question 
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the duress defense, which indisputably falls under § 2, is ―amorphous‖68 and 
hinges on easily-manipulated factors such as whether a threat is ―impro-
per.‖69 
Thus, many rules aggrandize courts and yet remain capable of voiding 
arbitration clauses.  Unless Congress meant to create a nasty recurring line-
drawing problem, the mere fact that a doctrine confers broad discretion on 
judges does not mean that it is unavailable to them. 
B. Contractual Overreaching 
Anti-court theorists also claim that Congress was aware that the FAA 
might allow stronger parties to impose arbitration on others, but ultimately 
decided that its virtues trumped these shortcomings.  These theorists focus 
on two exchanges in the legislative history.  First, Julius Henry Cohen, the 
author of the FAA, testified that the revocability doctrine reflected the fact 
that ―the stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts 
had to come in and protect them.‖70  As anti-court proponents argue, be-
cause Congress passed the FAA after Cohen flagged these concerns, it must 
have determined ―that simplicity and the desirability of enforcing arbitra-
tion provisions outweighed . . . protect[ing] vulnerable parties.‖71  Second, 
Senator Sterling, the Subcommittee Chairman, quizzed Cohen about rail-
road contracts offered on a ―take it or leave it‖ basis.72  Cohen replied by 
citing the governmental regulation of bills of lading and insurance contracts 
as evidence that ―people are protected to-day [sic] as never before.‖73  How-
ever, the anti-court theorists state that ―[n]owhere in his answer does Cohen 
indicate any role for courts in policing against overreaching contracts.‖74 
Yet it is not surprising that Cohen never mentioned that judges might 
protect adherents.  In 1925, they lacked the means to do so.  Policymakers 
had not started thinking about standard forms as part of a systemic problem.  
Indeed, it had been just six years since Edwin Patterson had introduced the 
phrase ―contract of adhesion‖ to American legal commentary.75  As I have 
argued above, the unconscionability doctrine was largely a way for courts 
sitting in equity to refuse specific performance of one-sided contracts.  
                                                                                                                           
depends on the facts of each case.‖ (quoting Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (link). 
68
  Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 920 n.4 (Utah 1993) (link). 
69
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981). 
70
  Friedman, supra note 5, at 2050–51 (quoting Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: 
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th 
Cong. 15 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)). 
71
  Id. at 2051. 
72
  See id. at 2051–52 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note70, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Co-
hen)). 
73
  Id. at 2052 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note 70, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)). 
74
  Id. 
75
  See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 
(1919). 
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Modern unconscionability, which would have applied to the standard form 
contracts that Cohen and Senator Sterling were discussing, did not emerge 
until the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, Congress never had to consider whether judges should pro-
tect weaker parties because the FAA as enacted was much narrower than it 
is today.  Congress arguably passed the statute under its Commerce Clause 
power.76  In 1925, however, Congress could not regulate intrastate transac-
tions.77  Thus, the FAA would have applied only to the rare adhesion con-
tract that was negotiated across state lines.  Alternatively, some judges and 
scholars believe that the FAA actually flowed from Congress‘s Article III 
authority to regulate federal courts.78  As a result, the statute would have on-
ly governed in diversity cases, where the parties were citizens of different 
states and the amount in controversy exceeded $3,00079—criteria that would 
have excluded most consumer, employment, and insurance agreements.  
Accordingly, Congress never faced the stark choice that the anti-court camp 
attributes to it between arbitration hegemony and protecting the rights of 
adherents. 
Thus, the most plausible explanation for any silence in the record about 
the role of courts is not that Congress intended to strip them of their ability 
to act as a bulwark against powerful drafters.  Rather, it is that Congress as-
sumed that the FAA applied largely to merchant-to-merchant transactions 
and thus did not create a serious risk of exploitation. 
C. The ―Making‖ of the Arbitration Clause 
Finally, both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories claim 
that unconscionability does not fall within § 4.  When a party moves to 
compel arbitration, § 4 states that: 
 
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied 
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not 
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties 
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement. . . .  If the making of the arbitration agree-
ment . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to 
the trial thereof.  If no jury trial be demanded by the party 
alleged to be in default, . . . the court shall hear and deter-
mine such issue.  Where such an issue is raised, the party 
alleged to be in default may . . . demand a jury trial of such 





  See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 106 (2002). 
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  See id. at 127–28. 
78
  See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 28 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (link). 
79
  See Drahozal, supra note 76, at 157 (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New 
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1926)). 
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arbitration was made . . . , the proceeding shall be dis-
missed.  If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration 
was made in writing . . . , the court shall make an order 
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitra-
tion in accordance with the terms thereof.80 
 
Thus, on its face, § 4 seems only to permit courts to resolve disputes 
about the ―making of the agreement for arbitration.‖ 
This passage is key to the anti-court theory.  For instance, Professor 
Friedman argues that unconscionability does not relate to the ―making‖ of 
the arbitration clause.  Instead, as he sees it, ―the contract has been made 
and we need to decide what to do with it.‖81  Accordingly, he concludes that 
§ 4 does not permit courts to entertain unconscionability challenges to arbi-
tration clauses.  Rather, courts must order cases to arbitration and permit the 
arbitrator to decide what to do with the potentially unconscionable provi-
sion.82 
Likewise, the phrase ―making of the agreement for arbitration‖ is cen-
tral to the anti-unconscionability theory as set out in Justice Thomas‘s con-
currence in Concepcion.  The seeds of Concepcion were sown in 2005, 
when the California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts could be uncons-
cionable when applied to numerous low-value claims.83  The state high 
court reasoned because plaintiffs will not prosecute such claims on an indi-
vidual basis, class arbitration waivers amount to ―‗get out of jail free‘ 
card[s]‖ for corporate liability.84  However, Concepcion held that the FAA 
preempts Discover Bank.85  The four-Justice majority reasoned that class 
arbitration is slower and more formal than bilateral arbitration.86  Thus, the 
majority held that California‘s attempt to guarantee such procedures for 
low-value claimants through the unconscionability doctrine ―stand[s] as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA‘s objectives.‖87 
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, a staunch textualist, has foresworn the 
freewheeling ―purposes[-]and[-]objectives‖ preemption that the majority 
deployed.88  As a result, he ―reluctantly‖ concurred and wrote separately to 





  9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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  Id. 
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  113 P.3d 1100, 1108–10 (Cal. 2005) (link). 
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  Id. at 1008 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
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  Id. at 1751. 
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meaning.89  First, he noted that § 2 makes arbitration clauses ―valid, irre-
vocable, and enforceable,‖ but only makes them vulnerable to 
―grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.‖90  This asymmetry led him 
to conclude that § 2 does not apply to ―all defenses applicable to any con-
tract but rather some subset of those defenses.‖91  To determine which de-
fenses fit the bill, he looked to § 4: 
 
When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in 
federal court, § 4 requires that ―upon being satisfied that 
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to 
comply therewith is not in issue,‖ the court must order arbi-
tration ―in accordance with the terms of the agreement.‖92 
 
Reading §§ 2 and 4 harmoniously, the ―grounds . . . for the revocation‖ 
preserved in § 2 would mean grounds related to the making of the agree-
ment.93 
Although Discover Bank claimed to apply the unconscionability doc-
trine, Justice Thomas found that it actually furthered California‘s interest in 
using the class action to deter corporate wrongdoing.94  Because it centered 
on these extrinsic policy considerations rather than the ―making‖ of the ar-
bitration provision, it was preempted. 
More broadly, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence implies that he does not 
think that modern unconscionability is a defense to an arbitration clause.  
For instance, he explains that §§ 2 and 4 require courts to enforce an arbi-
tration clause ―unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the 
formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual 
mistake.‖95  Unconscionability is conspicuously absent from that list.  Then, 
in a footnote, he cites Hume v. United States for the proposition that un-
conscionability ―historically concern[s] the making of an agreement.‖96  As 
noted, Hume involved the intrinsic fraud rule, a precursor to modern un-
conscionability.  The fact that Justice Thomas interprets the FAA to allow 
courts to utilize the intrinsic fraud rule does not necessarily mean that he 
would extend that logic to modern unconscionability, which did not exist 
when Congress passed the statute. 
As I explain in the next subparts, I disagree with the anti-court and an-
ti-unconscionability theories‘ view of these issues for three reasons.  First, I 
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As a result, there is no reason to try to shoehorn § 4‘s reference to the 
―making‖ of the arbitration clause into § 2.  Second, I do not believe that 
Congress intended the word ―making‖ to mean ―formation.‖  As I explain, 
this narrow reading would have undesirable consequences in other contexts, 
such as the separability doctrine.  Third, even if §§ 4 or 2 do, in fact, only 
encompass defenses that relate to contract formation, modern unconsciona-
bility satisfies this standard.  Even the species of unconscionability that Jus-
tice Thomas found preempted in Concepcion preserves the role of mutual 
assent in adhesion contracts and thus falls squarely within §§ 4 and 2. 
1. The False Link Between §§ 2 and 4 
Unlike the anti-court theory, which takes no position about the mean-
ing of § 2, the anti-unconscionability theory‘s central premise is that § 2 is 
ambiguous.  Indeed, as Justice Thomas observes, § 2 is lopsided: it makes 
arbitration clauses ―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ subject only to 
grounds for ―the revocation of any contract.‖97  Thus, Justice Thomas looks 
to § 4 ―[t]o clarify the meaning of § 2.‖98 
However, with one caveat, I believe that § 2 is clear on its face.  The 
phrases on which Justice Thomas focuses do two things.  First, they abolish 
the ouster and revocability rules.  They do this by making arbitration claus-
es ―valid‖ (overruling the ouster doctrine) and ―irrevocable‖ (eliminating 
the revocability principle).  Second, by making arbitration clauses ―enforce-
able,‖ they prohibit courts from denying specific performance.  Indeed, one 
of the FAA‘s major purposes was to require courts to automatically grant 
specific performance as the remedy for breach of an arbitration clause.99  
This need to make specific performance mandatory explains half of the 
―ambiguity‖ that Justice Thomas identifies: the omission of the word ―non-
enforcement.‖  Section 2 could not have stated that arbitration clauses are 
―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ subject to the grounds for the ―revoca-
tion and non-enforcement of any contract.‖  Doing so would have created a 
loophole that would have permitted courts to continue to decline to specifi-
cally enforce arbitration clauses. 
At this point, I want to acknowledge a corollary of my interpretation: 
the FAA does not allow courts to apply the doctrine of equitable uncons-
cionability.  By immunizing arbitration clauses from traditional contract 
rules that are ―grounds . . . for non-enforcement,‖ the statute eclipses any 
rule, including equitable unconscionability, that entitles judges to deny spe-
cific performance.  Thus, when Justice Thomas reasons that § 2 ―does not 
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those defenses,‖100 he is exactly right.  However, because equitable uncons-
cionability is only tenuously related to modern unconscionability, this con-
clusion makes little practical difference.  More importantly, once the ―non-
enforcement‖ puzzle is solved, § 2 contains only one true ambiguity: it does 
not state that arbitration clauses are susceptible to grounds for contractual 
―invalidity.‖ 
There are several plausible explanations for the absence of ―invalidi-
ty.‖  The most likely contender is that, as Justice Thomas acknowledges, 
―invalidity‖ and ―revocation‖ mean the same thing.101  ―Invalid‖ means ―be-
ing without legal force.‖102  ―Revoke‖ means ―to void.‖103  Because there is 
no difference between a contract that lacks legal force and one that is void, 
a contract cannot be ―invalid‖ unless it is ―revocable,‖ and vice versa.  In 
fact, in the years leading up to the FAA‘s passage, courts often emphasized 
that an agreement was binding by calling it ―valid and irrevocable.‖104  
Congress could easily have determined that ―revocation‖ made ―invalidity‖ 
superfluous. 
Another possibility stems from the FAA‘s drafting history.  The first 
glimmer of what would become § 2 can be found in a 1917 Illinois law that 
provided that ―[a] submission to arbitration shall . . . be irrevocable.‖105  Al-
though the statute only governed the arbitration of existing controversies 
(not future disputes), it influenced Julius Henry Cohen, who reproduced it 
verbatim in the appendix of his 1918 polemic Commercial Arbitration and 
the Law.106  Cohen then borrowed the basic structure of the Illinois legisla-
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made arbitration clauses ―valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.‖107  Not only did ending the provision with ―revocation‖ mirror the Il-
linois law, but it made sense because the revocability doctrine was so firmly 
established in New York that the legislature had seen fit to carve out a li-
mited exception to it in New York‘s Code of Civil Procedure.108  It was thus 
important to stress that the new Arbitration Act totally superseded the revo-
cability principle.  Cohen copied the New York statute‘s language in § 2 of 
the FAA.  Accordingly, the FAA‘s fixation on ―grounds for revocation‖ 
may simply be a historical accident. 
However, Justice Thomas‘s solution to the omission of ―invalidity‖ in 
§ 2—to import the phrase ―the making of the agreement for arbitration‖ 
from § 4—is not persuasive.  To be sure, ―[a] provision that may seem am-
biguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme.‖109  Yet there is no need to look outside the four corners of a statu-
tory provision unless it is actually ambiguous: susceptible to multiple rea-
sonable interpretations that would produce different outcomes when applied 
to the same facts.110  The fact that Congress did not use the word ―invalidi-
ty‖ in § 2 is not a real ambiguity.  As noted above, ―revocation‖ and ―inva-
lidity‖ are synonyms.  Because § 2 already uses the term ―revocation,‖ it 
would generate the same results in cases with or without the word ―invalidi-
ty.‖  Thus, Justice Thomas‘s justification for grafting language from § 4 in-
to § 2 is dubious. 
Moreover, even if § 2 is ambiguous, Justice Thomas‘s ―clarification‖ 
of it is a jarring non-sequitur.  There is no analytical relationship between 
the symptom (the omission of the word ―invalidity‖) and the cure (limiting 
§ 2 to defenses that relate to contract formation).  Because the statute uses 
the term ―revocation,‖ and ―revoke‖ is ―to void,‖ § 2 includes all defenses 
that can void a contract.  This is true whether the defenses relate to contract 
formation (like fraud) or not (like public policy).  The absence of ―invalidi-
ty‖ does not suggest that Congress meant something narrower than ―revoca-
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―revocation‖ in § 2 by inserting language from § 4, Justice Thomas does not 
―clarify‖ the statute.  Rather, he contradicts it. 
In fact, the FAA‘s legislative history elucidates that Congress believed 
that § 2 applied to all defenses—not just those that center on formation.  For 
instance, Senator Walsh expressed his understanding that ―[t]he court has 
got to hear and determine whether there is an agreement of arbitra-
tion, . . . and it is open to all defenses, equitable and legal.‖111  Similarly, in 
a law review article about the New York statute, Cohen wrote that it ―re-
cognizes that the infirmities, common to all contracts, which furnish 
grounds for revocation at law or in equity, may still exist in cases of arbitra-
tion agreements.‖112  To be sure, Cohen used the word ―revocation,‖ but, as 
noted above, grounds for ―revocation‖ include both formation and non-
formation-related defenses.  And at the very least, if § 2 did, in fact, only 
govern contract formation, there would have been some discussion of this 
point in the congressional record.  But there is none. 
Accordingly, § 4 sheds no light on § 2.  Of course, the fact that 
―grounds for revocation‖ includes all contract defenses (other than those 
that would be ―grounds for non-enforcement‖) does not mean that judges 
can freely apply these rules.  For instance, no court could invalidate an arbi-
tration clause because it believes that waiving the right to a jury trial vi-
olates public policy.  But contrary to Justice Thomas, that result does not 
stem from the language of § 2.  Instead, it arises from the doctrine of ―pur-
poses[-]and[-]objectives‖ preemption and the muscular pro-arbitration poli-
cy that the Court created out of whole cloth.  To be serious about textualism 
is to acknowledge that the statute only preempts a sliver of traditional con-
tract doctrine. 
2. ―Making‖ 
Both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories also claim that 
Congress used the phrase ―the making of the agreement for arbitration‖ in 
§ 4 to mean the ―formation‖ of the arbitration clause.  For instance, Profes-
sor Friedman argues that ―[u]nconscionability does not really go to the issue 
of whether a contract was made.‖113  And as noted above, Justice Thomas 
concludes that ―[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the making of the agree-
ment . . . could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration 
clause.‖114 
However, these approaches rely too heavily on words that Congress 
did not utilize with precision.  For instance, § 4 requires a court to order ar-
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―no agreement in writing for arbitration was made.‖115  Similarly, a report 
prepared by the House Committee on the Judiciary describes § 4 as offering 
―a method for the summary trial of any claim that no arbitration agreement 
ever was made.‖116  Read literally, these excerpts seem to require courts to 
order arbitration if there is a piece of paper that purports to be an arbitration 
clause.  Indeed, an arbitration clause induced by egregious fraud has been 
―made.‖  However, no one subscribes to this view.  Thus, the fact that Con-
gress used ―made‖ loosely militates against a hyper-literal reading of ―mak-
ing.‖ 
Moreover, if ―making‖ meant only ―formation,‖ it would have bizarre 
consequences outside the narrow context of unconscionability.  Section 4 
also provides the textual root of the separability doctrine.  As the Court has 
explained, judges cannot hear challenges to the container contract because 
§ 4 only permits them to resolve ―issue[s] which go[] to the ‗making‘ of the 
agreement to arbitrate.‖117  But if ―making‖ is ―formation,‖ then courts lack 
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the arbitration clause that do not relate 
to the contracting process.  Paradoxically, these would be the very claims—
that the arbitration provision is illegal or violates some non-preempted 
strand of the public policy defense—that Congress was least likely to en-
trust to arbitrators. 
Finally, Professor Friedman buttresses his argument by noting that § 4 
―is directed largely at safeguarding the right to trial by jury.‖118  Indeed, that 
provision repeatedly mentions the role of the jury in deciding whether to 
compel arbitration.  Because juries do not hear unconscionability chal-
lenges, Professor Friedman concludes that § 4 does not permit courts to in-
voke the rule.119 
Nevertheless, § 4 does not vest in juries the exclusive right to deter-
mine whether an arbitration clause was ―made.‖  To the contrary, it entrusts 
the court with ―hear[ing] and determin[ing]‖ that issue ―[i]f no jury trial be 
demanded by the party alleged to be in default.‖120  Moreover, there is a 
simple explanation for § 4‘s preoccupation with jury trials.  As noted, Co-
hen modeled the FAA on New York‘s arbitration law.  Section 3 of the 
New York statute, which served as the blueprint for § 4 of the FAA, de-
clared that if a party demanded a jury trial about the ―making‖ of the arbi-
tration clause, the judge should submit the matter ―to a jury in the manner 
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doing so, it preserved an important feature of New York‘s Code of Civil 
Procedure: the ability of parties to request a jury trial for equitable de-
fenses.122  Eliminating this entitlement would have raised a serious constitu-
tional problem.123  So, the New York statute (in a paragraph the FAA copied 
wholesale took pains to give juries an active role in challenges to the ―mak-
ing‖ of the arbitration clause.  Thus, the fact that § 4 refers repeatedly to 
jury trials is a holdover from the New York statute, not evidence of Con-
gress‘s intent to foreclose courts from entertaining equitable defenses such 
as unconscionability. 
3. Modern Unconscionability and Formation 
Finally, suppose that the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories 
are correct that only defenses that hinge on the ―making‖ of the arbitration 
clause fall within § 4 (or § 2).  As I have argued above, modern unconscio-
nability does, in fact, revolve around contract formation.  Indeed, modern 
unconscionability reflects the fact that ―gross inequality of bargaining pow-
er, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may 
confirm . . . that the weaker party . . . did not in fact assent or appear to as-
sent to the unfair terms.‖124  Under their own logic, then, the anti-court and 
anti-unconscionability theories do not remove unconscionability from the 
judicial arsenal. 
This conclusion is true even for the very application of the unconscio-
nability doctrine that Justice Thomas found to be preempted in Concepcion.  
Citing a passage in Discover Bank in which the California Supreme Court 
explained that class arbitration waivers can reduce the drafter‘s liability, 
Justice Thomas reasons that ―[e]xculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic ex-
ample of contracts that will not be enforced because of public policy.‖125  
He thus concludes that the state high court‘s holding does not revolve 
around the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause.  But there is a second, well-
established reason that courts strike down exculpatory clauses in adhesion 
contracts: because they are ―wanting in the element of voluntary assent.‖126  
Indeed, in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, a case that served as 
the springboard for Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court noted that 
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does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting of the 
risk.‖127  Thus, if Discover Bank had simply pointed out that consumers are 
unlikely to notice, understand, or agree to class arbitration waivers, Justice 
Thomas could not have found it to be preempted.  At most, then, the anti-
court and anti-unconscionability theories will change the rhetoric that 
judges employ, rather than the results they reach. 
CONCLUSION 
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are not convincing 
interpretations of the FAA.  The anti-court theory would make unconscion-
able arbitration clauses self-enforcing—a result that is both illogical and 
undesirable.  The anti-unconscionability theory takes an unduly narrow 
view of § 2.  Courts should reject these attempts to eliminate their role as a 
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